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THE CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD POLICY FAVORING
SUBSIDY REDUCTION TO LOCAL SERVICE CARRIERS: ITS
ROLE AND IMPLEMENTATION IN THE DECISIONAL PROCESS
PART TWO: THE DECISIONAL EFFECTUATION OF THE CAB
POLICY OF SUBSIDY REDUCTION IN ROUTE CERTIFICATION
OF LOCAL SERVICE CARRIERS
By BARRE HALL
I. INTRODUCTION
T WAS demonstrated in Part One that, as a means of policy effectuation,
Ithe Board developed various implementation programs. Two of the most
significant involved the use of the decisional process in local carrier mergers
or route certification. Although the merger program was not expounded
with absolute clarity by the Board, the various programs involving route
certification have been clearly set out on different occasions. In 1966,
they were gathered together by the Board in its annual report under the
general heading of "realignment of systems."'
The Board's system realignment program began to take form in 1965
and was outlined in the CAB's annual report for that year as a fairly
specific form of program, virtually unique unto itself and designed to
improve and extend the operating authority of the local service carriers!
At that point it was labelled simply "route realignment." However, by
1966 the system realignment program had been clarified and greatly ex-
panded to include five programs involving aspects of route certification,
all of which had been enunciated previously by the Board in one form or
another. The system realignment program was in reality a comprehensive
program for strengthening the routes of local carriers. The concept of
route strengthening implies improvement of routes, by various means,
until a point is reached where the beneficiary is closer to "break-even"
without subsidy than before the route was strengthened.
The stated objects of the CAB system realignment program are (1) the
improvement of route structure to provide greater service, and (2) the
continuation of the downward trend in Federal subsidy support." Only
'1966 C.A.B. Ann. Rep. at 3-8.
"Route realignment cases designed to improve and, in some instances, extend the operating au-
thority of local service carriers. This could be accomplished through route extensions, first air
service to cities, renewal and modification of temporarily certificated route segments, and possible
deletion or further modification of route segments experiencing unfavorable economic results."
1965 C.A.B. Ann. Rep. at 16.
a 1966 C.A.B. Ann. Rep. at 4.
'Id. at 4. These objects are not new to the Board. In 1966 Chairman Murphy had testified
before the Senate Aviation Subcommittee that the Board's threefold objective for the local carrier
industry was: continued improvement in service to the public; continued financial health for the
carriers; and continued reduction in subsidy. Hearings on the Local Air Carrier Industry Before
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the realization of the subsidy reduction objective will be explored in depth
herein.
The five component programs of system realignment have been clearly
set out by the Board as:
(1) Granting more liberal operating authority through the removal of
outdated operating restrictions;
(2) Giving local service carriers more access to higher density, short, and
medium haul markets, on a subsidy ineligible basis, even in instances where
such an award may involve competition with trunkline service;
(3) Transferring from trunklines to the local service carriers certain routes
which are marginally profitable for the trunks but which can receive better
service from the locals on a more economical and efficient basis;
(4) Consolidating service to two or more points at a single airport where
service convenience is improved and economies result;
(5) Improving economies by eliminating service at certain points which
have not shown, after a reasonable test period, that they can generate suffi-
cient traffic to justify continued airline service.5
The system realignment program was developed by the Board to realize
its objectives through proceedings involving the realignment of whole local
carrier systems.' It was a "total" approach developed by the Board and
premised upon the idea that broad proceedings are necessary to encompass
all the problems present in realigning a local carrier route system. Ques-
tions involving route segments, operating authority, new routes, generation
of traffic at particular points, route transfers, extra flights, and airport
consolidation typically arise in the realignment of a local carrier's system.
As noted, it will be my purpose to explore each component program
individually, not collectively as a single program. The reasons for adopting
this approach are two. In the first place, the component policies have exist-
ed separately, in most cases, for quite some time before being gathered into
the general system realignment program. Consequently, the individual
programs each have evolved their own distinctive characteristics and sur-
rounding bodies of doctrine which would tend to make their collective
consideration less meaningful. Secondly, the system realignment program
was designed to realize two objectives, namely, better service and lower
subsidy. Since only the latter is integral to this consideration only com-
ponent programs relevant to its effectuation need be considered. The
separation of the objectives for examination, as best possible, will facili-
tate an individual examination of each component program and hope-
the Aviation Subcommittee of the House Committee on Commerce, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 89-62
at 28, 37 (1966) [Hereafter referred to as Hearings on the Local Air Carrier Industry.] The ob-
ject of subsidy reduction has appeared long before this but was crystallized by President Kennedy's
request to the Board in April, 1962. The objects of subsidy reduction and better public service
have frequently served as objects for the various component programs of systems realignment and,
as the Board notes, for systems realignment proceedings in the year preceding June 30, 1966. The
objects are reflected in some Board decisions. See, e.g., North Central Airlines, Inc., Madison-Chicago
Nonstop Service, Docket No. 12,137, Order No. E-23463, 2 Av. L. REP. 3 21,620, although they
do not appear to have been specifically set out in any prior decision. The Board has long favored
the general objective of reducing subsidy although it did not become Board policy to reduce subsidy
until President Kennedy's request of 5 April 1962. See Chapter I, part B(4) supra.
5 1966 C.A.B. Ann. Rep. supra note 1, at 4.
' Id. at 4.
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fully produce a more meaningful and useful consideration of the effectua-
tion of the subsidy reduction policy.
The primary point of inquiry will be whether the CAB subsidy reduc-
tion policy has had any discernible effect on the Board route certification
decisions. In this connection, decisions involving the various component
programs will be examined.
Because the component programs have received varying degrees of atten-
tion in the Board's decisions they will receive varying emphasis in this
analysis. Dense route certification decisions, because they involve the most
significant component program, will receive primary attention.
The primary reason for the dominant importance of the dense route
certification program is not difficult to determine. Dense route certifica-
tion has much greater potential for increasing the local carriers' earn-
ings, and hence reducing subsidy, than the programs of "use-it-or-lose-
it," liberalized operating authority, route transfer, and airport con-
solidation combined. The top 115 short haul markets under 300 miles in
length generated over 3 billion revenue passenger miles in 1964 (with
only 14 per cent being handled by local carriers) whereas the entire local
carrier industry flew little more than 1.9 billion.! By contrast, the trunks
flew over 37.5 billion revenue passenger miles! If the locals were certifi-
cated en masse to the shorter dense routes they could conceivably double
their revenue passenger miles, without significantly impairing' the trunks,
and thereby greatly decrease their subsidy requirements-perhaps even
eliminate them. The great subsidy reduction potential of this program re-
quires the most thorough examination to determine whether the policy
of subsidy reduction is presently being effectuated by it. However, from
a chronological standpoint it may be useful to give prior consideration to
the other elements of the total program.
II. THE STATUTORY BASIS FOR ROUTE CERTIFICATION
Before discussing the various elements of the component programs, a
brief consideration of the law applicable to route certification is pertinent
,to furnish a general background, especially for the dense route certifica-
tion and route transfer programs in which certification plays a crucial role.
The Federal Aviation Act requires that before a carrier engages in any
air transportation the Board must issue a certificate authorizing such air
transportation."0 The certification requirement extends only to common
carriers in interstate commerce." It does not reach private carriers. 2 The
term "common carrier" has been construed so broadly by the Board that
almost all commercial carriers, with the exception of purely intrastate
Hearings on the Local Air Carrier Industry supra note 4, at 147.
O Id.
°This opinion is shared by the Board. Id. at 36.
" Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 401 (a), 76 Stat. 143, 49 U.S.C. § 1371 (a) (1964).
"See Hale & Hale, Competition or Control IV: Air Carriers, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 311, 314
(1961); W. JONES, CASES AND MATERIALS ON REGULATED INDUSTRIES 755 (1967).
1Hale & Hale, supra note 11, at 314.
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carriers, come within its licensing authority.'
The Board is instructed to issue a certificate "if it finds that the appli-
cant is fit, willing and able to perform such transportation properly, and
to conform to the provisions of this chapter, rules, regulations and re-
quirements of the Board hereunder, and that such transportation is required
by the public convenience and necessity; otherwise [the] application will
be denied." 1 The "fitness" requirement is satisfied upon showing (1) a
proper organizational basis for the operation, (2) adequate financial back-
ing, and (3) a plan for conducting the proposed operation. 5 This showing
rarely causes difficulty.'" The conformity to regulatory requirements is
determined by an examination of the applicant's past performance, al-
though since "need" is also a consideration, prior statutory and regulatory
violations are unlikely to create an absolute bar.'
In an early case before it the CAB enumerated the questions it would
ask in determining the "public convenience and necessity" requirement of
a proposed new route:
The primary questions to be considered in cases involving applications for
new service are, in substance, whether the new service will serve a useful
public purpose, responsive to a public need; whether this service can and
will be served adequately by existing routes or carriers; whether it can be
served by the applicant without impairing the operations of existing carriers
contrary to the public interest; and whether any cost of the proposed service
to the Government will be outweighed by the benefit which will accrue to
the public from the new service."
Although the case involved trunkline service only, the standands set out
remain generally applicable to certificate applications by local service car-
riers. The Board, of course, in its creation of the local service carrier indus-
try decided against the operation of the local carrier routes by the existing
trunklines thereby giving rise to a whole new level of certificated carriers."'
With this one exception and allowing for slight changes in the standards
applied by the Board in light of the unique nature of the local service
carriers and their more recent appearance in the air transport industry,
the above questions remain applicable in determining public "convenience
and necessity. '
In the situation where there is more than one application for certifica-
tion upon a given route, the CAB is required to hold a hearing to allow
each applicant to contest the fitness and suitability of the other applicants
for the route."' This requirement is known as the "Ashbacker" rule, having
' W. JONES, supra note 11, at 755. The so-called "third level carriers" were expressly exempted
from economic regulation by the C.A.B. 14 C.F.R. §§ 299.1-299.5 (1967).
"Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 401(d)(1), 76 Stat. 143, 49 U.S.C. § 1371(d) (1) (1964).
" W. JONES, sup4ra note 11, at 755.
'aId. at 756.
17 id.
"'Delta Air Corp., Service to Atlanta and Birmingham, 2 C.A.B. 447, 452 (1941).
"'For a complete discussion of the creation and nature of the local service carriers see Chapter
I (B) (2), infra.
50 See Zook, The Certification of Local and Feeder Air Carriers, 7 Sw. L.J. 185 (1953).
" Hale & Hale, supra note 11, at 314-15.
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been enunciated in Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC.2
Once a certificate has been issued it may be amended or suspended if
the public convenience and necessity so requires, but only after hearings
have been held. 3 However, temporary exemptions from the hearing re-
quirements and changes in service pattern are authorized without hearing."'
The local carriers have almost complete liberty to add to or change their
schedules, equipment, accommodations, or facilities for performing their
service."
It is instructive to note that the Federal Aviation Act provisions re-
garding route certification are a substantial re-enactment of the prede-
cessor statute, the Civil Aeronautics Act." One noteworthy exception,
however, is that the Civil Aeronautics Act contained a "grandfather"
clause automatically granting certificates to carriers operating at the time
of the statute's enactment." Since the legislation has remained substantially
unchanged since 1938, decisions reached under the old Act are not dis-
tinguishable from subsequent decisions on the basis of underlying legis-
lation.
The foregoing capsule summary of the law governing route applications
and certifications indicates the formidible control which the CAB exer-
cises over the size and nature of the local carrier route systems. The im-
portance of certification will be seen more readily in the consideration of
dense route certification later in this Chapter.
III. THE DECISIONAL EFFECTUATION OF THE CAB POLICY OF SUBSIDY
REDUCTION BY MEANS OF THE COMPONENT PROGRAMS
OF SYSTEMS REALIGNMENT
The major inquiry of this Part Two, as previously indicated, will con-
cern whether or not the CAB subsidy reduction policy has had any dis-
cernible effect on route certification decisions involving local service car-
riers. It was demonstrated previously that the CAB recently had developed
a "total" program, termed "realignment of systems," designed to realize
the twin objectives of improvement of service and reduction of subsidy.
The systems realignment program is itself composed of several programs
developed by the Board in earlier periods. Since each component program
involves some aspect of subsidy reduction and bears at least an indirect
relationship to route certification, each will receive individual considera-
tion regarding its role in effectuating the Board subsidy reduction policy.
aAshbacker Radio Corp. v. F.C.C., 326 U.S. 327 (1945).
"
5Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 401(e), 72 Stat. 731, 49 U.S.C. § 1371(g) (1964).
24 See 1966 C.A.B. Ann. Rep. 5.
5""No term, condition or limitation of a certificate shall restrict the right of an air carrier to
add to or change schedules, equipment, accommodations, and facilities for performing the authorized
transportation and service as the development of the business and demands of the public shall re-
quire .... " Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 401 (e) (4), 76 Star. 143, 49 U.S.C. § 1371 (e) (4)
(1964).
2See Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 401, 76 Stat. 143, 49 U.S.C. § 1371 (1964); Civil
Aeronautics Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 973 (1938).
27 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 988 (1938).
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A. Airport Consolidation
The CAB program of airport consolidation relates only indirectly to
route certification of local service airlines. The CAB has the authority to
determine the terminal and intermediate points to be served on a route,
and the specific airports as well;' that is about the extent of airport in-
fluence on local service carrier route certification. The effect of airport
consolidation upon route certification is thus indirect. Notwithstanding
this indirect relationship the airport consolidation program was developed
by the Board to reduce subsidy requirements and therefore merits con-
sideration.
Prior to the development of the Board's all-encompassing "system re-
alignment" the airport consolidation program existed independently. That
program first arose in a joint Civil Aerornautics Board-Federal Aviation
Agency press release, dated 2 May 1961.9 Therein airport consolidation
was announced as a policy favoring unification of air terminals where
such unification would improve financial as well as operational efficiency.s
The existence of this program was confirmed by the Board in its 1961
Annual Report. Therein the Board stated that the underlying considera-
tions of the program were the need to conserve grants of Federal funds
for new or enlarged airports and to conserve Federal funds needed to
support subsidized operations."
An airport consolidation program was urged upon the CAB by Presi-
dent Kennedy in his message to Congress of 5 April 1962.2 Subsidy re-
duction and improved services were put forth as supporting reasons for
such a program.' The President's request gave rise to the CAB's airport
consolidation program in 1963 when the Board reported to the President
that the consolidation of airline services for two or more cities at a single
airport would result in important savings and thereby reduce subsidy."'
It also suggested at that time that up to 44 airports would be eliminated
by such a program."
The Board's airport consolidation program was developed primarily to
cut costs and thereby reduce subsidy. Cutting costs was to be accomplished
by consolidating some stops on a local carrier's route thereby eliminating
expensive landings and takeoffs, and, providing service with fewer stops
thereby generating more traffic and a greater load factor. Where practical,
airport consolidations have been found to be capable of reducing costs
" Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 401 (e), 76 Stat. 143, 49 U.S.C. § 1371 (e) (1) (1964). It
has been held under the analogous provision of the Civil Aeronautics Act that the Board has author-
ity to designate service to an airport as a point. City of Dallas v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 221 F.2d
501 (D.C. Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 917 (1954).
2" Dockser, Airline Service Abandonment And Consolidation-A Chapter in The Battle Against
Subsidization, 32 J. AIR L. & CoM. 496, 515-16 (1966).
o Id. Referring to the joint press release.
as 1961 C.A.B. Ann. Rep. 26.
32 KENNEDY, Special Message to the Congress on Transportation, PULIC PAPERS OF THE PRESI-
DENTS, JOHN F. KENNEDY, 1962 (1962) at 297-98.
3 Id.
s' See CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON AIRLINE SUBSIDY REDUCTION
PROGRAM PURSUANT TO TRANSPORTATION MESSAGE OF 1962, (1963). [Hereinafter referred to as
CAB REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT.]
5 Id.
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and thereby reducing subsidy requirements. For example, in Columbia
and Jefferson City, Mo., Area Airline Service Airport Investigation," a
recent application, the Board found that an airport consolidation, at a
central airport midway between two cities, would result in greater traffic
volume, decreased operating costs, increased revenues, decreased subsidy
requirements totalling $193,000, and better service. The consolidation was
accordingly approved."
However, in the New Born and Jacksonville-Camp La Jeune Service
Case, a proposed consolidation of two airports was rejected by the Board
upon the Board's finding that citizens in the town destined to lose its air-
port would be seriously inconvenienced." Even though the continued
separate existence of the two airports would require an additional $61,000
annually in subsidy payment to the servicing local carrier, the Board denied
a unification."'
In a somewhat earlier decision, the Eastern North Carolina Area Airline
Service Airport Investigation, a proposed consolidation of four airports
into one area airport was rejected by the Board.' In reaching its decision
the CAB considered as factors: airport accessibility, airport capabilities,
traffic and frequency of service, and cost to the local air carrier and com-
munity.4 Subsidy reduction was not mentioned by the Board although the
Board did indicate that any cost savings realized by the servicing local
carrier would be more than offset by lost revenues resulting from traffic
loss.'
The foregoing decisions adequately illustrate the various considerations
made by the Board in deciding airport consolidations. From these decisions
several conclusions may be drawn. First, airport consolidation is capable
of increasing a local carrier's net profit, thereby reducing its subsidy re-
quirements. The Board has approved an airport consolidation which would
reduce subsidy but which would also generate more traffic and result in
better service. Second, the Board frequently balances several factors, in-
cluding potential subsidy reduction, in reaching a decision regarding air-
port consolidation. Third, the Board has not classified by statement, the
relation which its policy of subsidy reduction bears to other factors in its
airport consolidation decisions. Nor are the Board's decisions themselves
helpful in this regard.
Thus, it can be said that subsidy reduction has been a controlling
variable, but not the sole controlling variable, in some Board airport con-
solidation decisions. ' As such it has had a material effect upon the Board's
SColumbia and Jefferson City, Mo., Area Airline Service Airport Investigation, C.A.B. Docket
Nos. 15,567 et al, Order No. E-23,044, 2 Av. L. REP. 5 21,600 (28 Dec. 1965).
87 Id.
'sNew Bern And Jacksonville-Camp LeJeune Service Case; Docket Nos. 14,560 et al., Order
No. E-23,516, 2 Av. L. REP. 5 21,624 (12 April 1966).
"3 Id.
" Eastern North Carolina Area Airline Service Airport Investigation, Docket No. 13,728, Order
No. E-21,051, Av. L. REP. 1 21,486.01 (10 July 1964).
41 Id.
42 Id.
41 The Board did not directly discuss the materiality of quantum of potential subsidy reduction
in any of the decisions examined. However it did prepare a detailed estimate of potential subsidy re-
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decisional process. However, because the Board has not expanded upon the
role of the subsidy reduction policy in its decisions, dr the precise relation-
ship of the subsidy reduction factor to the other public policy factors
determinative of decisions, it cannot be determined whether the Board
subsidy reduction policy has had any effect upon the decision. It must be
concluded, then, that the Board subsidy reduction policy has not had a
discernible impact upon airport consolidation decisions."
B. "Use-It-Or-Lose-It"
In the Seven States Area Investigation the Board first enunciated its
"use-it-or-lose-it" policy."' The policy was a liberalized one designed to
offer communities of marginal traffic generation potential a chance to
demonstrate an ability to support local air service." To retain the initial
local service authorized by the Board, the community was required to
meet a standard of enplaning a minimum average of five passengers per
day over a test period covering the first 18 months of service."' If that
standard were not complied with the Board would commence proceedings,
in the absence of unusual or compelling circumstances, on the issue of
suspension or deletion of service."
From the foregoing it is readily apparent that the "use-it-or-lose-it"
policy relates directly to certification of local service carriers in that it is
capable of determining which marginal traffic points on a carrier's route
shall retain certification and which shall not. Undoubtedly, the efficient
certification of service points on a local carrier's routes will reflect in the
overall economy of a carrier's operations. A strict application of "use-it-
or-lose-it" could cut expenses and thereby reduce subsidy. It is the pur-
pose of this section to determine whether the Board policy of subsidy re-
duction has had a discernible material impact upon the "use-it-or-lose-it"
decisions.
In determining whether a smaller community could support local air
service,-it was given the benefit of the doubt during its first 18 months of
service. Although the five passenger per day for 18 months standard of
the "use-it-or-lose-it" policy at first appeared to be simplicity itself, the
CAB's application of the standard was not so straightforward. The standard
was difficult to apply directly in any given case because a myriad of ex-
duction in one case and did not hesitate to estimate the amount that subsidy would need to be in-
creased in another case if the airport consolidation were not approved. Thus it can be seen that the
Board was concerned with quantum of subsidy reduction which suggests that quantum played a
material role in at least some of the Board's decisions.
"'No new "area airport cases" have been instituted by the Board since the New Bern and Jack-
sonville-Camp Lejeune Service Case. "Issues of this nature have been folded into the broader route
realignment proceedings where they can be more adequately assessed with the overall need for
strengthening the local carriers and improving route structure." 1966 C.A.B. Ann. Rep. 6. The
accompanying interplay of the airport consolidation program with other component programs of
system realignment cannot be expected to simplify any future attempts to determine the effect
of the Board's subsidy reduction policy upon airport consolidation decisions pursuant to the system
realignment program.
" Seven States Area Investigation, 28 C.A.B. 680, 755-56 (1958).
"Gurney, The Development and Progress of the Local Service Airline Industry 6 S.D.L. REV.
79, 89 (1961).
' Seven States Area Investigation supra note 46, at 755.
111d. at 756.
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ceptions based on "unusual and compelling circumstances" began to arise
at the outset. " In situations where the community involved did not meet
the standard, deletion or suspension of service was frequently not realized
because various exceptions prevented a strict application of the standard.
Common bases for exceptions were: isolation and poor surface transporta-
tion; growing economic potential of the community; the attraction of
more traffic that would soon result from the use of new equipment; carrier
profits despite low usage; and, national defense."° Not only do exceptions
frequently frustrate the application of the direct standard but the appli-
cation is further complicated by the converse situation of "overriding con-
siderations." Briefly put, a community which meets the bare minimum
standard is not guaranteed retention of its service where the coterminous
service of another local carrier, close proximity of other airports, or, po-
tential subsidy may override the community's compliance with the stand-
ard." In conclusion it must be said that the "use-it-or-lose-it" policy ap-
plication is much more complex than its clear standard would imply.
In 1963 it was announced by the Board that the "use-it-or-lose-it"
policy was to be applied as a means of effectuating the more general Board
policy of subsidy reduction. The Board stated in reference to its general
overall program developed to reduce subsidy in compliance with the Presi-
dent's 1962 request:
This program presents objectives, policies and actions designed to . . . re--
duce operating subsidy on a time phased basis for those segments of the air
transportation industry that still require subsidy. . . . The fourth most im-
portant saving will come from continued application of our present 'use-it-
or-lose-it' station criterion of five passengers generated per day. 2
This announcement implies that the emphasis of "use-it-or-lose-it" would
now be placed upon reducing subsidy rather than determining whether a
community could support local service. Such a shift in emphasis would
seem to portend a stricter application of the "use-it-or-lose-it" standard.
The Board, however, stated that it aimed only to continue its 33 percent
suspension record averaged by it in past cases."
A perusal of the Board's more recent decisions confirm that no signifi-
cant change has occurred in the Board's application of "use-it-or-lose-it"
since the announced shift in emphasis. In one recent case the Board deleted
service when a local carrier failed to reach the minimum standard in the
absence of unusual or compelling circumstances.' In another case the Board
refused to delete service which did not reach the standard in view of an
exception based upon isolation and severe winter conditions experienced
"'See Dockser, supra note 29, at 513.
"0Id. at 513-14.
41Id. at 514-15.
5' CAB REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 34, at 2.
11 3i.
5 North' Central Airlines, Inc. "Use It Or Lose It" Investigation of Regina, Saskatchewan,
Canada, CAB Docket No. 14,337, Order No. E-21,738, 2 Av. L. REP. 5 21,539 (10 Dec. 1964.
Approved by the President 28 Jan. 1965).
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by the community." Finally, in a third recent case, the community in-
volved reached the five passenger standard but because service was available
at a nearby airport the Board concluded that the subsidy necessary to
maintain the service was disproportionate to the public benefits. In view
of this overriding consideration the Board deleted service to the commu-
nity."
Several conclusions flow from the foregoing consideration. First, it can
be said that the Board has expressed an intent to effectuate its subsidy
reduction policy by means of the "use-it-or-lose-it" program. Second,
the Board's decisions in "use-it-or-lose-it" proceedings, decided subsequently
to the Board's adoption of a subsidy reduction policy, do not indicate that
the Board's subsidy reduction policy has had any effect whatever upon
Board decisions dealing with "use-it-or-lose-it." "Overriding considera-
tions" have resulted in point deletions when the standard was complied
with, and, exceptions based on "unusual or compelling circumstances"
have maintained service where the standard was not satisfied. Such broad
variations from the standard by the Board make it clear that subsidy is
not being reduced by an application of the standard wherever possible.
Of greater significance, however, is the Board's own admission, in its 1963
report to the President, that its continued application of the "use-it-or-
lose-it" standard in pursuit of subsidy reduction will only maintain its
33 per cent suspension record that was averaged in cases prior to the adop-
tion of its subsidy reduction policy." This admission by the Board strongly
suggests that the adoption of a subsidy reduction policy has, had no effect
upon the Board's use of "use-it-or-lose-it" proceedings as a means to
further reduce subsidy.
Finally, the Board did not discuss the role of subsidy reduction or the
subsidy reduction policy in any of the decisions examined. Hence, it can-
not be determined authoritatively whether subsidy reduction has been a
controlling variable in any of the decisions examined. On the other hand,
the Board's admission of its intended maintenance of a 33 per cent suspen-
sion record in these proceedings after its adoption of a subsidy reduction
policy, is strongly suggestive that the Board's subsidy reduction policy has
not had a material effect on Board "use-it-or-lose-it" decisions. '
. C. Liberalized Operating Authority
The granting of more liberal operating authority to local carriers is
another component program of the Board's comprehensive system realign-
ment program. Unfortunately the Board has not stated with precision
"' Frontier-North Central Route Transfer "Use It Or Lose It" Investigation, CAB Docket Nos.
13,394 et a/., Order No. E-22,290, 2 Av. L. REP. 5 21,566 (10 June 1965).
" Coeur D'Alene/Roseburg Service Investigation, Docket No. 16,256, Order No. E-25,081, 2
Av. L. REP. 5 21,714 (1 May 1967).
17 CAB REPORT TO THE PIiESIDENT, supra note 34, at 2. The Board was referring to cases in
which the communities involved received at least two daily round trips. Id.
" The Board will not commence any "use-it-or-lose-it" proceedings in the future since issues of
this nature, like airport consolidations, will be dealt with in the broader "route realignment" pro-
ceedings. 1966 C.A.B. Ann. Rep. 6.
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exactly what the term "liberalized operating authority" encompasses.
At first glance it could conceivably have reference to any of the questions
to which the system realignment program is addressed."0 These questions
concern: "segment consolidation, more liberal operating authority, new
route authority, elimination of poor traffic generating points, airport con-
solidation, route transfers, and various other issues related to better, more
economical service.""5 Because all the above questions except segment con-
solidation are subsumed by various component programs other than
liberalized operating authority, it would seem likely that the component
program of granting more liberal operating authority is at least partially
concerned with the question of segment consolidation." Because it has not
been made clear by the Board what else, if anything, liberal operating
authority is concerned with, this section will focus primarily ,upon segment
consolidation."
Segment realignment is a broad term implying that a transfer of certifi-
cated points from one route segment to another can result in more efficient
and economical operations. The realignment of a carrier's route segments
through a judicious transference of certificated points from one route to
another, a redesignation of various points, as well as a consolidation of
route segments where feasible, can clearly lead to more efficient and eco-
nomical operations for that carrier. This relationship was demonstrated in
the 1966 Ozark Air Lines Inc., Renewal of Segments 12, 13, 14 and 15
decision which dealt partially with a segment realignment." Therein the
Board decided that the transfer of two certificated points to a newly created
route segment would connect the two points to their principal community
of interest and allow them to demonstrate their true traffic generation
potential, afford important operational and scheduling benefits, and, re-
duce subsidy. 5 The Board estimated that subsidy reduction in excess of
$35,000 annually would result from the transfer of the two points in the
segment realignment. The Board did not elaborate, however, upon the
relationship of subsidy reduction to the other factors of its decision, nor
did it mention its policy of subsidy reduction.
It is clear that subsidy reduction was one of several controlling variables
59 It can, however, be achieved "through the removal of outdated operating restrictions." 1966
C.A.B. Ann. Rep. 4.0 The Board's statement of its system realignment program is set out in Section A of this chap-
ter.
61 1966 C.A.B. Ann. Rep. 4.
"2 This conclusion is strongly supported by the Board's indication in a recent case that liberalized
operating authority may refer to resegmentation and removal of certain mandatory stop require-
ments. Mohawk Route 94 Realignment Investigation, Docket No s.16,133 et al., Order No.
E-24,699, 2 Av. L. REP. 5 21,695 (21 Feb. 1967).
" It is possible that "skip-stop" service and dense route certification are contemplated to some
extent by "liberalized operating authority" since both literally involve a liberalization of operating
authority. The "skip-stop" program provides for intermediate points on a route segment to be
overflown upon compliance with certain provisions set out by the Board. Seven States Service In-
vestigation, 28 C.A.B. 680, 758-62 (1958). Because "skip-stop" service between terminals is so
closely related to dense route certification (for example, skipping intermediate points on a dense
route is tantamount to being certificated non-stop on that dense route) it will be considered in
conjunction with dense route certification at a later point.
64Ozark Air Lines Inc., Renewal of Segments 12, 13, 14 & 15, Docket Nos. 14,818 et al.,
Order No. E-23,096, 2 Av. L. REP. 5 21,602 (6 Jan. 1966).
'5 Id.
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in the Board's segment realignment decision. The Board did not, however,
enunciate precisely what role subsidy reduction did play in its decision
nor did it mention or elaborate upon its policy of subsidy reduction and
its effect, if any, upon other Board decisions. Because subsidy reduction
was only one of several controlling variables in the Board's decision, and
because a connection between it and the Board's subsidy reduction policy
cannot be established, it must be concluded that the Board's subsidy reduc-
tion policy has not had a discernible material effect upon this Board de-
cision.
An examination of other recent Board decisions involving segment re-
alignment reveals that the Board has treated subsidy reduction and the
subsidy reduction policy much as it did in the Ozark Segment Renewal
decision.6 The role of subsidy reduction is still vague, and the Board has
not mentioned the effect of its subsidy reduction policy in these decisions.
Thus, an effect upon segment consolidation proceedings by the Board policy
of subsidy reduction cannot be established. The conclusion follows that the
Board subsidy reduction policy has not had a discernible material effect
upon decisions involving liberalized operating authority as developed
through segment realignment. 7
D. Route Transfer And Substitution
Route transfer and substitution concerns the transfer of either whole
routes, or individual groups of points, from one class of carrier to the
other. To date the direction of change has been almost totally from trunk
to local carriers. The transfer of routes to points to local carriers is closely
related to the certification of these carriers on to dense traffic routes since
points capable of heavy traffic generation are sometimes transferred to local
carriers. The net effect of such a transfer is very similar to that of an out-
right dense route certification.
Route transfers can occur either pursuant to an agreement between the
transferring trunk and the local carrier, approved by the Board, or in the
usual manner of abandonment by the trunkline followed by CAB certifi-
cation of a local carrier upon the route. 8 Individual points, on the other
hand, may be either suspended or deleted from a trunkline's routes
and transferred to a local carrier for service."' Since a route is merely a
collection of certificated points, served by a carrier in some specified order,
the close relationship between route and point transfer is evident. A marked
11 See, e.g., Allegheny Airlines Inc., Segment Renewal And Route Realignment Investigation,
Docket Nos. 16,474 et al., Order No. E-25,847, 2 Av. L. REP. 5 21,748 (17 Oct. 1967); Mohawk
Route 94 Realignment Investigation, Docket Nos. 16,133 et al., Order No. E-24,669, 2 Av.
L. REp. 5 21,695 (21 Feb. 1967). Quantum of potential subsidy reduction resulting from segment
realignment was not explored by the Board in either of these decisions. When considered with the
Ozark Renewal, supra note 64, it appears that the evidence is insufficient to support any conclusion
regarding the materiality of quantum of potential subsidy reduction in the Board's decisions.
67 Since segment consolidation (i.e., liberalized operating authority) is now considered by the
Board only as a component of systems realignment, any future attempt to determine the effect
of the Board's subsidy reduction policy upon segment consolidation proceedings will prove even
more difficult because of the interaction of the various other component programs.
6SDockser, supra note 29, at 511.
69See United Air Lines, Inc. Deletion of Route 34 Points, Docket Nos. 11,614 et al., Order
No. E-23,295, 2 Av. L. REp. 9 21,611 (28 Feb. 1966).
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degree of similarity will therefore be expected in the CAB's treatment of
cases involving each.
Early in the local carriers' history the Board decided that a local route
unnecessary to a trunkline's operations should be operated by a local
service carrier alone."0 This position of the Board was consistent with its
earlier position that local carriers, being solely interested in providing local
service, were better able to provide local service than were the trunkline
carriers on whose list of priorities local service ranked low. The increased
efficiency with which a local carrier could operate a local route could result
in decreased costs and increased traffic (and revenues) leading in turn to
subsidy reduction.
Although it is evident that the extra efficiency of local carriers in operat-
ing local routes can lead to a subsidy reduction for those carriers, after
receiving new routes or points from a trunkline, it is important to note
that such subsidy reduction is not inevitable. Route transfers can result
in no change or even an increase in the subsidy requirement of a local
carrier receiving transferred operating authority.
Proposed transfers of trunkline operating authority to local carriers
which involved potential subsidy reduction for the local carrier have been
viewed favorably by the Board7' although not necessarily approved on that
ground. Conversely, proposed transfers which involved potential subsidy
increases for the local carrier have been viewed with disfavor,2 and al-
though such applications were sometimes denied on this ground,3 such
was not inveriably the case.
In the earlier cases subsidy reduction, or increase, was a factor considered
by the Board in deciding route and point transfers but was infrequently
determinative of the decision in itself. ' The most recent Board decisions
involving route transfer indicate a somewhat different trend. In one route
transfer case a trunkline route was suspended for three years and a local
carrier selected to serve the points thereby deleted.7 The pertinent factors
in the Board's decision were maintenance of service to the communities
involved as well as a general route strengthening of the local carrier with-
out any increase in subsidy requirement. The same reasons were repeated
in the Piedmont Case (Norfolk-North Proposals).' The Board reached a
similar decision in a third case, approving a four point substitution of a
local carrier on the ground that better service would result without any
increase in subsidy requirements. 7 Taken together these decisions indicate
that if a local carrier can either improve service to the points transferred,
or strengthen its own routes, without additional subsidy being required in
7 Piedmont Certificate Renewal Case, 15 C.A.B. 736, 810 (1952).
" Wiggins Renewal Investigation, 16 C.A.B. 483 (1952).
"6Pacific Northwest Local Air Service Case, 29 C.A.B. 660 (1959).
73 Id.
" See Dockser supra note 29, at 509-11.
7'United Airlines, Inc. Deletion of Route 34 Points, supra note 69.
"8Piedmont Case, (Norfolk-North Proposals) Docket Nos. 5,713 et al., Order No. E-23,716,
2 Av. L. REP. 3 21,637 (20 May 1966).
" Houston-New Orleans Local Service Investigation, Docket No. 13,508 et al., Order Serial
No. E-23,296, 2 Av. L. REP. 5 21,612 (28 Feb. 1966).
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either case, the Board will approve the application for route transfer.
Subsidy reduction was not a controlling variable in any of the decisions
considered and hence was not a material factor in the Board's decisions.
Although some subsidy reduction, however slight, could likely be achieved
by trunk-local route transfer, the Board has not sought to make affirmative
use of this method to reduce subsidy. Thus, because the Board appears to
have made no attempt to reduce subsidy in its route transfer decisions, it
is clear that the policy of subsidy has had no impact on such decisions."
E. Dense Route Certification (And "Skip-Stop" Service)
On 28 February 1966, CAB Chairman C. S. Murphy tendered a state-
ment to the Senate Aviation Subcommittee outlining the existing condition
of the local service carrier industry, its problems, some suggested remedies,
and the Board's objectives for the future." The main body of the state-
ment was declared by Chairman Murphy to represent the consensus of
the Board's thinking."
The statement commenced with a declaration of the Board's objectives
for the future namely continued improved service, continued financial
health for the carriers, and continued reduction in subsidy. s' It then pro-
ceeded to review extensively the course which local carrier subsidy had
taken over the previous few years."2 It was observed that while subsidy per
revenue passenger-mile flown and subsidy as a per cent of total revenues
had both declined substantially in the 1952-1965 period, the total local
service subsidy requirement had not peaked until the year 1963. 83 The
subsequent decline in subsidy from that year has not been great." The
statement forecast that if past policies were continued total local carrier
subsidy would remain near then-current levels."
Although not so stating, the context of the statement implied that the
Board was not satisfied with maintaining the existing subsidy levels and
reiterated its objective to reduce them, below the carriers' own forecasts,
by increasing earnings. It suggested as means of reducing subsidy the
future utilization of more efficient aircraft, and route strengthening by
providing local carriers with access to higher density routes. 6 Since the
choice of aircraft depends entirely on the local carrier, pursuit of that
method of subsidy reduction will continue to lie with the local carriers
themselves. Potential dense route certification, however, is much more
significant. For the first time the Board had announced in positive terms
a position favorable to certificating local carriers into the more lucrative,
8 In 1966 the Board stated that it was incorporating route transfer into its all-eiicompassing
system realignment program and that no new route transfer cases, as such, would be heard by it.
1966 C.A.B. Ann. Rep. 6. This development could make detection of the effect of the Board
subsidy reduction policy upon route transfer and substitution very difficult because of the multi-
tude of different factors which will be involved in future decisions.
79 Hearings on the Local Air Carrier Industry, supra note 4, at 27-68 (1966).
80 ld. at 41.
' Id. at 28.
85Id. at 38-39.
RaId. at 31.
84See 1966 C.A.B. Ann. Rep. 35; 1965 C.A.B. Ann. Rep. 35.
8' Hearings on the Local Air Carrier Industry, supra note 4, at 33 (1966).
S61d. at 33, 3S.
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high density air traffic markets. The purpose of this step was clearly to
accelerate a decrease in local carrier subsidy requirements through increas-
ing earnings of these carriers.
A brief consideration of the Board's "skip-stop" program is pertinent
at this point. In many respects the Board's "skip-stop" program has fore-
shadowed the dense-route certification program. First announced in the
Seven States Area Investigation in 1958, " its avowed objectives were to
reduce the local carriers subsidy requirements and to improve service to
the public."' It provided, in the case of new route authorizations, that
"skip-stop" service could be effected throughout the whole route segment,
terminal-to-terminal if desired, after the local carrier had completed two
daily round trips touching every point on the route segment.' (Where
trunkline carriers provided terminal-to-terminal service on the segment
the local carrier would be required to make one, perhaps two, intermediate
stops to prevent direct trunk-local carrier competition.) The initiation
of such "skip-stop" service was left to management's discretion and the
Board admonished that subsidy would not necessarily be supplied for
such non-stop service. The local carriers had thus, in effect, become certifi-
cated to provide non-stop service on dense routes in cases where route
terminals (or intermediate points separated by lengthy distances) were
fair-sized population centers. Unlike direct dense route certification, how-
ever, the stop restriction discouraged direct local carrier-trunkline competi-
tion."
Even though it had not formally announced its local service subsidy
reduction policy, the Board was at this time actively seeking to effectuate
subsidy reduction. The Board had allowed management, the agency best
qualified to make profit-loss decisions, to decide when extra service would
be provided. The uncertainty of subsidy for any new service predisposed
management to commence only potentially profitable and overall subsidy
reducing service. Thus, "skip-stop" authority appears to have been given
by the Board to the local airlines, at least partially, to effectuate subsidy
reduction.
"Skip-stop" authority is still being used by the local carriers to achieve
the Board's dual objectives of subsidy reduction and improvement of serv-
ice, although some refinements have occurred. Intermediate points must
still receive two round trip flights a day before being skipped, unless a
departure from this requirement is shown to be warranted. However, local
carriers are being allowed to compete, directly with trunks in some dense
markets, for example, Baltimore -Indianapolis and Baltimore-Cincinnati."'
"
7 Seven States Area Investigation, 28 C.A.B. 680, 758-62 (1958).
88 id. at 759.
"I1d. at 758-59.
" It is very difficult for carrier A to compete on a given route with carrier B if carrier A
must stop at one or more intermediate points while carrier B has non-stop authority. There is a
strong tendency, other factors being equal, for passengers to select the non-stop (and therefore
quicker) carrier.
91 See, e.g., Lake Central Airlines, Inc. "Use It Or Lose It" and Route Realignment Investiga-
tion, Docket Nos. 14,868 et al., Order No. E-23,589, 2 Av. L. REp. 5 21,631 (27 April 1966).
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Such competitive "skip-stop" flights are invariably ineligible for subsidy
however."2
"Skip-stop" authority provided the local carriers with a means to both
reduce subsidy and improve service. Because it foreshadowed the Board's
dense route certification program both as to objectives (subsidy reduction
and improved service) and means (non-stop air transport on denser
routes), no inquiry will be initiated concerning the impact of the Board's
subsidy reduction policy on "skip-stop" proceedings. It will be sufficient
to note, at this point, the resemblance of dense route certification to
"skip-stop" authority.
The major question posed, however, is simply whether the Board, having
adopted a policy of subsidy reduction and having announced a program
of dense route certification for local service carriers, has actually effectuated
its policy in dense certification cases. The answering of this question will
determine whether or not the Board subsidy reduction policy has had a dis-
cernible material effect upon the Board's decisions involving dense route
certification.
It should first be noted that in 1966 the local carriers requested the
Board to strengthen their systems through the use of two related methods
of route certification: "by relaxing present route and operating restrictions,
by allowing them to compete with trunklines in denser markets, and by
awarding them new operating authority over potentially profitable
routes.""3 The Board responded that it favored this avenue of subsidy
reduction and. would henceforth pursue it on a case-by-case basis."
The program thus specified by the Board to reduce local carrier subsidy
could alter drastically the nature of the local service carriers, if imple-
mented. It could also blur many of the critical distinctions separating local
and trunk carriers. The main distinguishing characteristics of local carriers
previously had been (1) their aversion to direct competition, with trunk-
lines, or, other local carriers; (2) the multistop local or feeder nature of
their routes; and (3) their objective of providing service to small commu-
nities at the expense of making profits and becoming self-sufficient.
It is clear that implementation of dense route certification of local carriers
would alter their character toward a trunkline nature. Competition with
local and trunk carriers would result, service would be preponderantly non-
92 1d.
93 Hearings on the Local Air Carrier Industry, supra note 4, at 35.
14 Id. at 35, 36. This appears to be tlse first time that the Board stated affirmatively that it
favored route strengthening for local carriers through competitive dense (and profitable) route
certification on a case-by-case basis. The Board's very response that "[t]his avenue for strengthen-
ing the local carriers . . . is one which the Board views with favor and which it plans to pursue
on a case-by-case basis," suggests that up to this time (28 February 1966) the Board had not
been relying on such a program but intended to resort to such in the future. However, the dense
route certification program was foreshadowed to some extent by the Board in its 1965 Annual
Report wherein it was noted that in certain realignment cases improved route authority had been
granted some local service carriers. 1965 C.A.B. Ann. Rep. 16-19. By 1966 the dense route certi-
fication program had become a component program of the more comprehensive system realignment
program. See 1966 C.A.B. Ann. Rep. 3-9.
95 See C. FULDA, COMPETITION IN THE REGULATED INDUSTRIES: TRANSPORTATION 192-94
(1961). The distinguishing features of trunk and local carriers were discussed in detail in Chapter
I(B) (2) supra.
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stop, and profit would tend to displace service as the theme of operations.
Any attempt to determine whether the Board is actually effectuating
its subsidy reduction policy by the certification of local carriers on dense
routes necessarily involve consideration of route certification decisions
rendered prior to the Board's adoption of its subsidy reduction policy and
those rendered subsequent to it. The object of such consideration is simply
to detect differences in decisions and supporting rationale indicative of
the implementation of dense route certification directed toward subsidy
reduction.
The foregoing approach requires the establishment of at least an approxi-
mate date for the coming into force of the dense route certification pro-
gram."6 Since the Board first unequivocally announced its dense route
certification program on 28 February 1966, though Board Chairman C. S.
Murphy, (who was announcing the views of the Board), this date would
seem to be appropriate as a tentative date for the program's initiation."'
It can be expected that subsequent to the Board's development of its dense
route certifications program, approval of dense route certification applica-
tions will be increased since the Board ought to be using this program to
reduce subsidy requirements of the local carrier applicants.
It is clear that a primary consideration of the Board in dense route
certification cases brought subsequent to the Board's dense route program
will be potential subsidy reduction for the applicant local carrier. The Board
stated that potential subsidy reduction 'must be present, through the
applicant's sharing in the denser more lucrative traffic, for the Board to
consider certificating a local carrier on a dense route.9 9 The Board has also
announced as conditions precedent to certification the adequate serving
of the travelling public's interest and the avoidance of impairing other
air carriers.9" Although these standards are somewhat vague and potentially
in conflict it would seem reasonable, in view of prior discussion throughout
this paper, to theorize that if there is no decrease in service or quality the
travelling public's interest would be satisfied and that only traffic diversion
of a substantial nature would impair another carrier. The Board also noted
that dense route certification would be effected almost entirely on a non-
subsidy basis.'
In seeking to determine whether the CAB is effectuating its subsidy
reduction policy by dense route certification of local carriers, decisions
rendered both prior and subsequent to the Board's adoption of a subsidy
reduction policy will be examined. From the prior decisions we might sur-
mise that the Board would place heavy emphasis upon the traditional local
carrier objectives of providing primarily local and feeder air transport
services. Hence the Board would be expected to avoid local carrier certifi-
96 The CAB policy of subsidy reduction for local service carriers was adopted on or about
April 5, 1962.' Its origin was discussed in greater detail in Chapter I(B) (4) supra.
17 See note 94 supra.
9
s See Hearings on the Local Air Carrier Industry, supra note 4, at 36.
99 Id.
'Id. The Board did not specify when and where exceptions would be made. It merely in-
dicated reluctance to award new operating authority to local carriers for the purpose of "route
strengthening" unless the carriers were willing to accept it on a non-subsidy ba:,is.
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cations involving dense routes, non-stop authority, and competition with
other carriers, certificating only multistop, sparsely populated non-com-
petitive routes. Deviations from such a certification pattern would be ex-
pected only under exceptional circumstances accompanied by a valid
explanation. On the other hand, to the extent that the Board is effectuating
its subsidy reduction policy in decisions rendered subsequent to the adop-
tion of its subsidy reduction policy we would expect that the long-cher-
ished local carrier characteristics would be less significant in the Board's
deliberations. Instead the emphasis would shift to decreasing subsidy by
increasing the local carriers' traffic carried without increasing the costs of
carriage proportionately. Non-stop, dense route, competitive service, with-
out subsidy eligiblity, would necessarily characterize the form of the new
local carrier dense route service. Decisions rendered subsequent to the
Board's dense route certification program would be expected to reflect
the new emphasis more intensively than those rendered prior to it.
An examination of dense route certification decisions rendered by the
Board prior to its adoption of a subsidy reduction policy indicates that
very few dense route applications were approved. In the Piedmont Local
Service Area Investigation0' proceeding the Board did not award any dense,
non-stop routes, although it did award or extend some dense, multistop
routes.' The Board gave potential diversion as the reason for refusing
one dense route application. The Board did not mention potential subsidy
reduction in its decision, nor did it reveal any connection between subsidy
reduction and dense route certification. In the Piedmont Local Service case
the Board appeared primarily interested in balancing Piedmont's routes
and providing local and feeder service to the communities on those routes.
In the Great Lakes Local Service Investigation' the Board demonstrated
that its primary concern was properly balancing the local carrier's route
system and providing local and feeder service. In that case the Board
denied a route extension of dense route proportion (urged by a city inter-
venor) on the ground that it would turn the local carrier into a "regional
trunkline carrier" which would not be consistent with the Board's con-
cept of local service and trunkline authorizations." 4 In this connection
subsidy reduction was not mentioned."s
In some cases, however, the Board did certificate local carriers on dense
routes prior to its subsidy reduction policy. In Mohawk Airlines, Inc.,"°
the Board renewed Mohawk's non-stop, dense route, Syracuse-New York
authority for an indefinite period without subsidy. Although the Board
noted that Mohawk could expect a profit on this route it did not mention
potential subsidy reduction."0
' Piedmont Local Servcie Area Investigation (Final Portion), 35 C.A.B. 586 (1962).
102 id.
"'Great Lakes Local Service Investigation, 31 C.A.B. 442 (1960); Supplemental Opinion, 33
C.A.B. 430 (1961).
104 Supplemental Opinion, supra note 103, at 437.
151 The Board has refrained from certificating local carriers on dense routes in many other
route certification proceedings.
"'Mohawk Airlines Inc., 33 C.A.B. 75 (1961).
107 Id.
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In the Pacific-Southwest Local Service Case,"0 8 however, the Board grant-
ed a dense, Los Angeles-Las Vegas, non-stop route to Bonanza, a local
carrier, because it could provide the necessary service and its subsidy re-
quirements would be reduced. The Board did not discuss subsidy reduction
in depth but did satisfy itself that Bonanza would be able to make a
profit on the route. It appears, then, that quantum of subsidy reduction
was not a significant consideration in the Board's decision although subsidy
reduction in itself was.
In conclusion it can be said that prior to the Board's adoption of a
subsidy reduction policy the Board did not approve many applications of
local carriers for dense routes. Nevertheless it did approve some, and in the
Pacific-Southwest Local Service Case anticipated subsidy reduction was a
controlling variable in the Board's decision. It must be concluded, then,
that prior to the Board's adoption of its subsidy reduction policy, subsidy
reduction was a material factor in some dense route certification decisions
of the Board. Thus, in Board dense route certification decisions rendered
subsequent to the Board's adoption of its subsidy reduction policy, the
mere existence of subsidy reduction as a material factor of decision cannot
be taken, in itself, as indicative of a material effect of the subsidy reduc-
tion policy upon the Board's decision.
Unfortunately, in the first three decisions examined above, the Board
did not mention subsidy reduction. In the final decision, the Pacific-
Southwest Local Service case, subsidy reduction was a controlling variable
in the Board's decision but the Board did not elaborate on its role in the
decision. Thus, it is not possible to determine precisely what role subsidy
reduction played in the Board dense route certification decisions prior to
its adoption of a subsidy reduction policy.
Having examined particular dense route certification decisions rendered
by the Board prior to its adoption of a subsidy reduction policy for the
purpose of determining the role of subsidy reduction in pre-subsidy re-
duction policy cases, attention is now focused upon Board post-policy
decisions. In this connection decisions rendered subsequent to the Board's
dense route certification program will receive primary consideration.""9
Subsequent to its announcement of a dense route certification program
for local carriers the Board declared that pursuit of such a program re-
quired a case-by-case approach in view of the substantial and diverse
interests of the parties involved."' The Board also stated that in each case
it would be necessary to determine "whether the proposed action will in
fact improve the position of a local carrier, whether the interest of the
travelling public will be adequately served and whether the condition of
another carrier will be unduly impaired ....' It appears, then, that in con-
108Pacific-Southwest Local Service Case, 35 C.A.B. 50 (1962).
" In view of the fact that the dense route certification program was designed to realize sub-
sidy reduction for the local carriers, dense route decisions pursuant to it would most likely reflect
the Board's effectuation of its subsidy reduction policy. Hence, an) Cffc-t of the subsidy reduction
policy on dense route certification decisions would most likely occur in those decisions.
"'0 Hearings on the Local Air Carrier Industry, supra note 4, at 36.
111 Id.
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sidering a local carrier application for a dense route certification those
three questions will be posed by the Board, after, of course, the need for
service upon the route has been ascertained. The first question, concerning
the improvement of the local carrier's position, would seem to require a
likely improvement in subsidy position by the applicant local carrier upon
assumption of a given dense route. The answering of this question in the
affirmative would seem to be a condition precedent to any certification
since one of the primary objectives of dense route certification, as stated
by the Board, is improvement in the local carriers' subsidy position. There
would be little point to certificating local carriers on dense routes without
any subsidy improvement.
If subsidy reduction appears likely, then the next step for the Board
would be an evaluation of the interest of the travelling pubic and the
potential hinderance of the certification upon other air carriers. Since the
travelling public's interest must be limited to air service provided, and
since the most serious impairing of other air carriers stems from diversion
of traffic, service and diversion must be the two other factors requiring
consideration by the Board in dense route certification application. Because
improvement of service is one of the Board's stated primary objectives
in its dense route certification program, it is likely that this requirement
will also form a condition precedent to a local carrier's dense route certifi-
cation. Lack of diversion of traffic, however, would likely not be a condi-
tion precedent to a favorable Board dense route certification because only
reduction of subsidy and improvement of service are primary objectives
of the program. It would seem reasonable to assume that in assigning
weight to this factor in its dense route decisions the Board will allow some
diversion from other carriers but the amount allowable will depend at
least partly on the size of the potential subsidy saving. No deterioration of
service or lack of improvement in subsidy would likely be tolerated,
though, because each is a primary objective of the Board program. The
reason for this disparity of treatment is that any route certification will
result in some (however slight) diversion of traffic from other carriers;
but it would not seem reasonable for the Board to deny a potential subsidy-
reducing, service improving, certification if the diversion were of a de
minimis order. Therefore the Board will be forced to carefully evaluate
any diversion as to extent and then weigh it against the potential subsidy
reduction realizable.
The former Board guidemark of requiring local carriers to provide
only local and feeder service to the smaller communities, which service
by nature was not competitive with trunklines, nor necessary on dense
routes, will not be relied upon by the Board at all in rendering a route
certification decision because dense route service and local and feeder service
appear to be mutually exclusive.
In conclusion, then it can be stated that if the Board is affectuating its
policy of subsidy reduction by means of its dense route certification of
local carriers program it will approve applications for dense route certifi-
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cation where the potential subsidy reduction and service improvement is
sufficient to outweigh any diversion of traffic from other carriers. The lack
of local service character of the dense route service will not enter any
consideration by the Board.
An examination of all the Board dense route certification decisions ren-
dered subsequent to the announcement of its dense route certification
program reveals that a vast majority of decisions have been favorable to
dense route certification of local carriers. Six decisions will be considered
herein since that is sufficient to exemplifying any determination of whether
the Board is effectuating its policy through dense route certification.'
On 3 April 1966 the Board decided the North Central Airlines, Inc.,
Madison-Chicago Nonstop Service case, an application by a local service
carrier, North Central Airlines, regarding removal of a one stop require-
ment on its 108 mile Chicago-Madison route."' In rendering its decision
the Board referred to its own order of five years previous allowing North
Central to operate non-stop flights in its own discretion after first pro-
viding two round trips per day to each of two intermediate stops on
separate routes connecting Chicago and Madison."' This provided a rare
opportunity for the Board to examine the results of non-stop service by
a local carrier on the dense, competitive route in question, before deciding
the application. The Board noted that such non-stop ("skip-stop") "lati-
tude," although directly competitive with Northwest Orient, a tru'nkline,
had benefitted the travelling public, improved North Central's financial
situation, improved the carrier's pattern of service, and worked no hard-
ship whatever on Northwest."' On this basis the Board approved the appli-
cation thereby certificating the local carrier non-stop on the route without
subsidy eligibility."' The Board did not elaborate further upon the results
of such a competitive, dense route certification but its reference to its pre-
vious decision must be taken as incorporated into the rationale of its
decision.
The Board had, in effect, approved the non-stop dense route in view
of its power to aid North Central's financial position (and thereby po-
tentially to reduce subsidy) while at the same time improving the local
' The Board has decided many applications involving dense route certification since it de-
veloped its dense route certification program. It is felt that the six decisions considered at this
point are fairly representative of the entire class of decisions involving dense route certification
because they involve the vast majority of factors considered by the Board in reaching decisions
regarding dense route certification applications.
"' North Central Airlines, Inc., Madison-Chicago Non-stop Service, Docket No. 12,137 (Order
Serial No. E-23,463), 2 Av. L. REP. 5 21,620 (3 April 1966). It appears from the decision that
originally North Central was subject to a condition requiring it to provide service to one inter-
mediate stop between Chicago and Madison on all flights made. This condition was modified in
1961 by order E-17,286 to allow North Central to provide non-stop service between Chicago and
Madison after Milwaukee on segment 1, and Beloit-Janesville on segment 5, each received 2 round
trips daily. In the present proceeding North Central sought complete deletion of the original con-
dition to allow it to service Chicago-Madison non-stop on all trips. (Hence it can be seen that for
the five year period, 1961-1966, North Central was able to fly non-stop, after four one stop round
trips per day, two stopping at Milwaukee, two at Beloit-Janesville, in direct competition with
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carrier's pattern of service and overall service to the travelling public
without any diversion of traffic from the trunkline. All the positive factors
for rendering a favorable decision appear to have been present. The con-
clusion is suggested that subsidy reduction and service improvement were
the controlling variables in the Board's decision. Of course the service to
the point deleted was not improved but seemingly eliminated. This factor
was not sufficiently weighty to override the other considerations.
The Board did not directly mention subsidy reduction in its decision.
It did not discuss the relation of subsidy reduction to improved service
or traffic diversion, or its expected quantum. Nor did it comment upon
the role of the subsidy reduction policy in the decision."7 In view of the
foregoing considerations it must be concluded that the Board policy of
subsidy reduction has not had a discernible material effect on this particular
dense route certification decision.
In the reopened New York-Florida Renewal Case the Board certificated
Allegheny, a local carrier to provide non-stop service in the Boston-
Washington and Boston-Philadelphia markets for which the carrier would
be ineligible for subsidy.1 8 The Board found that such certification would
"strengthen Allegheny's system in conformance with the Board's policy
as to local service carriers"'' 9 which suggests that the Board anticipated a
reduction in subsidy requirement. The Board also found that a useful
service would be provided to the travelling public, that the soundness of
Allegheny's local routes would not be jeopardized thereby, and that no
"serious" diversions would affect the numerous trunklines already serving
the market. Since some diversion must occur when a new carrier is certifi-
cated into a competitive market the Board hedged its position somewhat
by adding "serious" to the diversion requirement. It seems then that di-
version only becomes an offsetting factor of weight in the Board's delibera-
tions when it has reached the "serious" level.
The Board did not directly mention subsidy reduction in the New York-
Florida Renewal although its presence as a factor of decision is suggested.
Neither did it elaborate on the relationship of the factor of "strength-
en[ing] Allegheny's system in conformance with the Board's policy as
to local service carriers" to the other factors of decision. Quantum of
potential subsidy reduction and the role of the subsidy reduction policy
17 A thorough examination of all the Board decisions regarding dense route certification of
local carriers, made subsequent to the Board's announcement of that program, reveals that the
Board has never certificated a local carrier on to a dense route unless it has satisfied itself not only
that no deterioration in service to the travelling public would result but also that the service would
actually improve, at least slightly, overall. This result is consistent with the twofold objective of
the Board policy underlying its dense route certification program, namely, to reduce subsidy and
to improve service. This -suggests that the Board is scrupulous in certificating to local carriers
only dense routes which improve overall service to the travelling public as well as reduce subsidy
requirements. Thus the process used by the Board is one of balancing the pertinent factors to
arrive at a decision. Unfortunately, however, without some elucidating discussion by the Board
concerning service improvement and subsidy reduction in a given decision, it is virtually impossible
to apportion the motivating force provided by each factor in the decision. Meaningful conclusions
concerning the effect of the subsidy reduction policy on Board decisions thus are more difficult
to reach.
"1' Reopened New York-Florida Renewal Case, Docket Nos. 12,285 el al., Order No. 24,808,
2 Av. L. REP. 5 21,700 (2 March 1967).
11 Id.
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was not mentioned. Although the presence of subsidy reduction as a
material factor in the decision is suggested, it is not possible to determine
the role played by the subsidy reduction policy.
In the Pacific Northwest-Southwest Service Investigation, the Board
noted the potential subsidy reduction and benefit to the travelling public
of a non-stop certification of Frontier, a local carrier, on the dense Denver-
Kansas City-St. Louis route."'° It then noted that although no serious di-
version would result to the nearby carriers, Braniff, Continental and TWA,
what diversion there was would be outweighed by the benefits of certifi-
cating Frontier, and, in any event, would be more than offset by new
authority awarded these carriers in the same proceeding."' Frontier was
certificated.
Subsidy reduction and improved service to the public were the con-
trolling variables in the Board's decision. The Board did not discuss
quantum of potential subsidy reduction but was content to satisfy itself
that Frontier's operations would be profitable. The Board did not discuss
the role of its subsidy reduction policy in the decision, nor the relationship
of subsidy reduction to improved service. Thus, although subsidy reduction
was a material factor in the Board's decision, the Board's policy of subsidy
reduction has not had a discernible material effect upon the decision.''
Some local carrier applications for dense route certification have been
denied by the Board. Such denials fall into two principal categories. The
first concerns denials resulting from certification of another local carrier
on to the dense route in question. In the Detroit/Erie-Toronto Case, Alle-
gheny was awarded the Erie-Toronto route, on a non-subsidy basis, over
Lake Central since, of the two applicants, it was able to provide the most
complete service in terms of equipment, flight frequencies and passengers
carried, and also because "Allegheny's proposed service plan will be con-
siderably more profitable than Lake Central's."' " The Board noted that
over the long run it anticipated a substantial subsidy reduction for Alle-
gheny and that Allegheny's certification would not be detrimental to
any other carrier." '
It is clear that subsidy reduction was a controlling variable (as was
improved service) in the Board's decision to award the relatively dense
Erie-Toronto route to a local carrier. Because the Board also considered
20Pacific Northwest-Southwest Service Investigation, Docket No. S. 15,459 et al., Order No.
E-24,970, 2 Av. L. REP. 3 21,695 (28 Feb. 1967).
121 Id.
122 The foregoing two decisions, Pacific Northwest-Southwest, and New York-Florida, indicate
that the Board will tolerate the slight, inevitable diversion which results in a great many new
carrier certifications. However, it cannot be concluded on this basis alone that the Board will only
tolerate slight diversion. Since no dense route cases have been decided involving more than mini-
mal diversion of traffic from other carriers, it is not possible to determine what degree of diversion
the Board will tolerate in certificating local carriers on dense routes which will lead to improved
service for the travelling public and subsidy reduction. It can be seen that diversion is a factor
given some consideration by the Board in its dense route certification decisions, although its pre-
cise role is not clear. If its role in the decisional process were somewhat clearer it could be helpful
in determining the role of subsidy reduction in the decisional process and hence the effect of the
Board policy of subsidy reduction upon the decisional process.
12 Detroit/Erie-Toronto case, Docket Nos. 16,928 et al.. Order No. E-24,903, 2 Av. L. REP.
21,706 (31 Jan. 1967) (Approved by the President, 25 March 1967).
121 mh.
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potential profitability (which likely would flow through to subsidy re-
duction in large part) as the dominant factor in choosing between Alle-
gheny and Lake Central as operators of the route, it would seem likely
that quantum of subsidy reduction was a material factor in the Board's
decision. Again, however, no mention was made of the Board's subsidy re-
duction policy, or its role in this decision. Nor was the relationship of
service improvement to subsidy reduction discussed. Thus, although sub-
sidy reduction was significant in both aspects of the Board's decision, it
must still be concluded that the Board's subsidy reduction did not have a
discernible material effect upon this decision.
The second category of denial concerns inadequacy of service provided
the travelling public. An example is provided by the Los Angeles/Chicago-
Toronto Service Case in which the Board refused to certificate North
Central on to the dense Chicago-Toronto route even though it declared
that such a certification would result in substantial subsidy reduction for
the local carrier. '25 (Traffic diversion was not in issue since the Board was
committed to certificating a second carrier for this route."2 ) The Board
stated that it was denying North Central's application because it could
not provide travellers with single plane or single carrier service west of
Chicago as could the successful trunkline applicant, United. '27 That is to
say, North Central's possible service was not adequate and therefore would
not adequately serve the interest of the travelling public. Furthermore,
United had a greater historic participation in Toronto traffic. For these
reasons the Board selected United for the route.
Thus, improvement of service and historic participating in the market
were the controlling variables in the Board's denial of North Central's
application and its award of the dense route to United. Although the
Board did note that the award of the route to North Central might well
reduce North Central's subsidy, this factor was not a material factor in
the Board's decision. Quantum of potential subsidy reduction was not
mentioned and neither was the Board's subsidy reduction policy or its
role. Thus, it must be concluded that the Board's policy of subsidy re-
duction did not have a discernible material effect upon the Board's de-
cision.
Of late the Board has developed a comprehensive program termed "sys-
tem realignment" which is designed to realign entire local carrier systems
and, in so doing, deal with questions of segment consolidation, more
liberal operating authority, transfer of points, airport consolidation, and
dense route certification."' The objectives of system realignment are the
improvement of service and the reduction of subsidy. Cases involving
system realignment vary considerably in the number of questions which
125 Los Angeles/Chicago-Toronto Service Case, Docket Nos. 16,901 et al., Order No. E-24,904,
2 Av. L. REP. 5 21,707 (31 Jan. 1967).
126 See Id.
127 hi.
12' For a more complete discussion of the policy underlying system realignment and a descrip-
tion of the program itself see part A of this chapter.
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are treated in the decision."' By no means can it be said that every system
realignment case deals with all questions which the system realignment
program embraces. Rather, a typical system realignment case will deal with
only a few of the questions encompassed by the system realignment pro-
gram.
The Mohawk Route 94 Realigniment Investigation'5 furnishes a useful
decision for examining dense route certification as a component program
of the system realignment program. In that case the Board approved
liberalized operating authority by removing certain mandatory stop pro-
visions in Mohawk's certificate, thereby bringing the carrier into direct
competition with American Airlines, a trunk carrier, and to a lesser ex-
tent with Allegheny, another local carrier."' The Board also approved
liberalized operating authority in the form of resegmentation. In reaching
its decision the Board stated that Mohawk's financial position would be
strengthened, service to the public would be improved, and no harmful
diversion would occur.' a' The new authority would be subsidy ineligible.
It can be seen that the Board decision involved the related component
programs of dense route certification and resegmentation. While the Board
considered both aspects together its greatest emphasis, by far, was placed
on the dense route authority and specifically potential competition with
American. Because the Board did not separate its considerations of dense
route authority and resegmentation" ait is somewhat difficult to determine
which considerations apply to each program.
While the Board stated at the outset that "[t]his investigation was
undertaken by the Board as a means of strengthening Mohawk Airlines,
Inc. (Mohawk) and reducing its dependence on subsidy . . . ." it did not
mention quantum of subsidy reduction. The Board did concern itself with
the expected operating profit which Mohawk would earn on the route
($1,414,000) of which some portion would undoubtedly flow through to
subsidy reduction.
The Board also concerned itself deeply with allowing Mohawk to com-
pete with American for fear that American's competition would be too
much for it. The Board decided that on the basis of its record Mohawk
could compete well with American and that on balance Mohawk should
be allowed the new authorities because they would improve services and
Mohawk could "explore their potential for bettering its financial posi-
,,134tion....
129 Compare Lake Central Airlines Inc. "Use It Or Lose It" and Route Realignment Investi-
gation, Docket Nos. 14,868 et al., Order No. E-23,589, 2 Av. L. REP. 5 21,631 (27 April 1966)
with Mohawk Route 94 Realignment Investigation, Docket Nos. 16,133 et al., Order No. E-24,669,
2 Av. L. REP. 1 21,695 (21 Feb. 1967).
'3°Mohawk Route 94 Realignment Investigation, Docket Nos. 16,133 rt a!., Order No.
E-24,669, 2 Av. L. REP. 5 21,695 (21 Feb. 1967).
"' It would seem here that the liberalized operating authority in the form of removing certain
mandatory stops would amount to permission to fly non-stop on dense routes. In this regard the
Board did not specify which routes Mohawk would be flying when the mandatory stops were re-
moved but it did state that the markets in issue "are relatively dense, shorthaul, commuter mark-
ets." It also noted that Mohawk could provide non-stop service under its new authority. Id.
132 Id.
"'After mentioning resegmentation the Board did not return to discuss it in tle case. Id.
134 Id.
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The controlling variables in the Board's decision were improvement of
service and improvement of the local carrier's financial position (with
consequent subsidy reduction). The policy of subsidy reduction, however,
was not mentioned. Thus, subsidy reduction appears to have been a ma-
terial factor in the decision. However, because the Board did not articulate
the role of its subsidy reduction policy in this decision, and because the
evidence does not permit a conclusion in that regard, it must be concluded
that the Board subsidy reduction policy has not had a discernible material
effect upon the decision.
On the basis of the Mohawk Route 94 Realignment Investigation, it
appears that the principal effect of the system realignment program on
dense route certification decisions has been the complicating effect of
introducing additional complicating component programs (for example
segment realignment) into the Board's considerations.'35 It appears then
that the system realignment program has not influenced the effect of the
Board's subsidy reduction policy in dense route certification decisions.
D. Conclusions
In the Board's airport consolidation decisions it was seen that while po-
tential subsidy reduction, was a controlling variable in some decisions, in
others it was not. Because subsidy reduction was never a sole controlling
variable, and because the Board did not mention the precise role of subsidy
reduction, or the subsidy reduction policy, in its decisions, it was con-
cluded that the Board's subsidy reduction policy had not had a discernible,
material effect upon the Board's airport consolidation decisions.
In the Board's "use-it-or-lose-it" decisions it was demonstrated that no
evidence indicated that subsidy reduction was a material factor in the
Board's decisions. Further, the Board's intented adherence to its pre-subsidy
reduction policy suspension record of 33 percent, after its adoption of a
subsidy reduction policy, strongly suggested that the subsidy reduction
policy had not had a material effect upon these proceedings. The conclu-
sion followed that the Board subsidy reduction had not had a discernible
material effect upon the Board's "use-it-or-lose-it" decisions.
With regard to the Board decisions involving liberalized operating
authority, as developed through segment realignment, it was demonstrated
that subsidy reduction was capable of acting as a controlling variable,
along with other controlling variables, but that no connection between the
Board's subsidy reduction policy and the role of subsidy reduction in the
Board's decisional process could be established. Therefore, the conclusion
followed that the Board policy of subsidy reduction had not had a discern-
ible material effect upon decisions involving liberalized operating authority
'3 The fact that two component programs of the system realignment are being applied in this
case does not make its analysis any easier, in fact it tends to complicate it. It is evident that in
decisions involving more than two component programs, determination of the effect of the Board's
subsidy reduction policy would be made more difficult because of the increase in factors involved
in the Board's decision. Unless, of course, the Board considered each component program's appli-
cation to the decision individually. This course would seem to defeat the purpose of the system
realignment program, that is, to provide a comprehensive program for strengthening the routes
of the local carriers.
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as developed through segment realignment.
In the Board route transfer and substitution decisions examined, it was
demonstrated that subsidy reduction was not a controlling variable and
thus not a material factor in the Board's decisional process. It was con-
cluded, therefore, that the Board policy of subsidy reduction had not had
a material impact upon the Board route transfer and substitution decisions.
It was demonstrated, upon examining several dense route certification
decisions, rendered by the Board prior to its subsidy reduction policy, that
few local carrier dense route applications were approved during this period.
However some dense route applications were approved and in one decision
potential subsidy reduction was the dominant controlling variable. Thus
it can be said that even prior to the Board's adoption of a subsidy reduc-
tion policy, subsidy reduction was capable of having a material effect
in the Board's decisions. Unfortunately, however, neither the role of sub-
sidy reduction nor quantum was discussed by the Board in its pre-policy
decisions. Thus, in a comparison between the role of subsidy reduction, or
quantum, in decisions rendered before the subsidy reduction policy and
decisions rendered after it, it would be extremely difficult if not impossible
to detect significant changes in the latter decisions which might indicate
an effect of the subsidy reduction policy upon those decisions.
Upon examination of several dense route certification decisions, rendered
by the Board subsequent to its adoption of a subsidy reduction policy,
several conclusions emerged. In every decision examined either financial
improvement (and potential subsidy reduction) or subsidy reduction itself
was a controlling variable and hence a material factor in the decision.
However, the Board did not mention or discuss the precise role of financial
improvement or subsidy reduction in its decisions. Nor did it mention
quantum of subsidy reduction or the role of the subsidy reduction policy
in the decisions examined. Thus, because it was not possible to compare
the role of subsidy reduction, or quantum, in the decisions rendered after
the subsidy reduction policy with those rendered before, and because the
role of the subsidy reduction policy in the subsequent decisions was not
mentioned, the conclusion was required that the subsidy reduction policy
had not had a discernible material effect on the Board's dense route certifi-
cation decisions.
Because subsidy reduction was a material factor in at least one Board
dense route decision rendered prior to the subsidy reduction policy, it is
not possible to conclude that subsidy reduction was only a material factor
in decisions rendered subsequently and that the subsidy reduction policy,
being the only significant variable, had had a material effect on the latter
decisions. On the other hand, the relatively small number of dense route
decisions involving subsidy reduction as a material factor prior to the
subsidy reduction policy, and the relatively large number rendered subse-
quent to the policy, mildly suggests the possibility that the subsidy reduc-
tion policy did have some material effect in the decisions rendered subse-
quently. However, because factors other than subsidy reduction typically
1969]
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enter the Board's consideration in dense route certification decisions, a
causal connection could not be established. The suggested possible material
effect ought not be accorded significant weight therefore. Thus, it must
be concluded that the Board policy of subsidy reduction has not had a
discernible material effect upon the Board's dense route certification de-
cisions.
V. CONCLUSIONS TO PART ONE AND Two
The first overall conclusion which can be drawn concerns the Board's
adoption of its subsidy reduction policy and implementation programs.
Since these areas have been examined in depth previously it is sufficient to
note that the Board did not formally announce its subsidy reduction policy
for local service carriers but rather it responded on 3 July 1963, to a re-
quest from the President of 5 April 1962, to formulate a subsidy reduc-
tion program. It appears then, that the actual date of the subsidy reduc-
tion policy's adoption is not absolutely clear. Similarly with regard to some
of the programs designed to implement the subsidy reduction policy (name-
ly, the favoring of local carrier mergers, and dense route certification),
the Board did not indicate their existence until 28 February 1966, nearly
four years from the President's request for subsidy reduction. Even then,
the Board's merger favoring program was not stated unequivocally but
was mentioned in such a way as to amount to little more than a predis-
position toward this approach. Finally, the Board did not specifically ex-
plain the relationship of its subsidy reduction policy to its implementation
programs. Thus, it must be concluded that the Board has not unequivocally
enunciated its subsidy reduction policy, nor has it precisely related some
of its implementation programs to its subsidy reduction policy.
The Board's decisional process resembles that of an appellate court in
many ways. The Board hears the various parties, applicants, corporate and
community intervenors, and the Bureau of Operating Rights representing
the public interest, in an adversary proceeding. It also considers its hear-
ing examiner's recommended decision and then prepares an opinion making
findings of fact, discussing law, and some policy, making a decision and
setting out an order. Since the CAB writes reasoned opinions like a court,
its opinions can be treated much like a court's would be.
In the Board's consideration of the various merger and route certifica-
tion applications, and applications related to route certification (such as
"use-it-or-lose-it" and airport consolidation) it will be recalled that the
merger and route certification applications were subjected to legislative
standards of consistency with the public interest (and non-creation of
monopoly) and requirement by the public convenience and necessity, re-
spectively. Applications only related to route certification were subjected
to legislative standards only so far as actual point certifications were con-
cerned, although some, such as "use-it-or-lose-it," were also concerned
with relevant Board standards. In all three categories of decision, however,
the Board evaluated and weighed various factors before arriving it a de-
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cision. The balancing of the various factors was critical to the approval
or denial of an application.
In deciding a merger application the Board typically would consider
such factors as financial benefit, or subsidy reduction, service improve-
ment, traffic integration, connection of related trade areas, resulting trunk-
line character, diversion (and monopoly). In dense route certification
applications such factors as financial benefit, or subsidy reduction, service
improvement and diversion bear the Board's greatest consideration. Simi-
larly, various factors are considered in the applications related to route
certification. However, when the Board is balancing factors in reaching
a decision it rarely discusses or elaborates upon the precise roles and sig-
nificance of the various factors considered in connection with the final
decision. The Board typically notes only those factors which it found
favorable to its decision. It is possible to detect the controlling variables
which are having a material effect in the decision but not possible to de-
termine precisely what their effect is. Occasionally the Board mentions
factors unfavorable as well as factors favorable. It has not however made.
any attempt to ascribe a weight to the various factors of a decision for the
purpose of indicating more precisely their roles and significance. The fore-
going analysis holds true for all three categories of Board decision examined
herein. Further, there does not seem to have been substantial variation be-
tween cases examined.
The Board is even less lucid when it comes to the role of its various
enunciated policies in its decisions. Whereas the Board did occasionally
discuss some of the factors in its decisions, it rarely, if ever, mentioned the
role or significance of its own specific policies in any of the three categories
of decision examined. Thus, a discussion of the Board's subsidy policy did
not appear in any of the merger, dense route certification or related de-
cisions examined. It would seem then, that in avoiding elaboration upon
the roles and significance of the various factors Of decision, and the Board's
own relevant policies, the Board has managed to "keep its options open"
for future decisions. It is now able to alter directions with minimal resist-
ance from its previous decisions.
With the exception of some decisions related to route certification, in
which subsidy reduction was absent as a material factor, or in which the
Board revealed the significance of subsidy reduction to its decision (as,
for example, the Board did concerning airport consolidation) it is extremely
difficult, if not impossible, to determine the precise role and significance
of the subsidy reduction factor, and the Board's policy of subsidy reduc-
tion, by an examination of decisions in the three categories. Therefore, it
must be concluded that it is not possible to determine, from an examination
of merger, dense route certification or many related decisions, themselves,
what effect the Board policy of subsidy reduction is having on the decisional
process.
In a further attempt to determine whether the Board subsidy reduction
policy was having a material effect upon the Board's merger and densc
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route certification decisions, decisions rendered in each category prior to
the subsidy reduction policy and subsequent to it were examined. The
object was to examine opposite decisions containing similar factors with
the existence of the subsidy reduction policy being the only material
variable. This technique proved effective in considering merger decisions
although the presence or absence of important factors detracted from the
significance of most comparisons. The presence of subsidy reduction as a
controlling variable in dense route certification decisions rendered prior
to the subsidy reduction policy, however, effectively prevented the de-
termination of its role, or that of the subsidy reduction policy, in deci-
sions rendered subsequently. Since subsidy reduction was a controlling
variable in decisions prior to the subsidy reduction policy, and de-
cisions subsequent to it, it could not be the sole material variable in de-
cisions compared. Thus, even a comparison of dense route certification
decisions was unable to discern any material effect of the subsidy reduction
policy upon those decisions. It must be concluded that, even in comparing
merger or dense route certification decisions, rendered prior and subsequent
to the subsidy reduction policy, it is difficulty to determine whether the
subsidy reduction policy has had a discernible material effect upon the
Board's decisional process.
As noted previously, in deciding merger, dense route certification and
related applications, the Board typically balances several factors. The bal-
ancing process also reflects various Board policies such as the subsidy re-
duction policy, continued improvement in public service, and continued
financial health for the local service carriers. Thus, it can be concluded
that subsidy reduction, or any other factor of public policy, will not likely
serve as the sole determinant of Board decisions in any of the three cate-
gories examined. Nor will the subsidy reduction policy likely be the only
policy capable of exerting a material influence upon Board decisions.
In conclusion, it can be said that the subsidy reduction policy can be
detected as having a discernible material effect on the Board's decisional
process in merger applications. However, it cannot be detected as having a
discernible material effect upon dense route certification and related de-
cisions. In all categories of Board decision examined, determination of the
presence or absence of a discernible material effect of the subsidy reduc-
tion policy was difficult. It is hoped that the following recommendation
will be constructive in suggesting some improvements for the Board's de-
cisional process.
In view of the previously discussed conclusions regarding the enuncia-
tion of the Board's subsidy reduction policy, and merger and dense route
certification implementation programs, the following suggestions are ad-
vanced. First, in the future, the Board should clearly and unequivocally
enunciate its policies in a regular, formal publication such as the Federal
Register or other appropriate publication. Second, the Board should also
clearly set out in such publication any programs of implementation which
it intends to use to implement its policy as well as clearly explaining the
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relationship of the implementation programs to its policy. As new programs
are developed they should also be set out in this manner. Finally, the Board
should set out all its policies announced over a given year in its annual
report, along with any implementation programs, policy objectives, and
the dates of policies and implementation program announcements. The
effectuation of the above recommendations would clarify future Board
policies, objectives and means of implementation, and allow parties affected
by Board policies to prepare their positions accordingly.
With regard to the conclusions discussed previously, concerning the
Board's decisional effectuation Of policy, the following suggestions are
advanced. First, the Board should discuss in some depth the various roles
and interaction of the factors determinative of compliance with the ap-
propriate legislative standard. In this connection it would be helpful if
the Board indicated the relative weight accorded each factor. Second, the
Board should also elaborate upon the roles and significance of the various
policies relevant to its decision. The implementation of the above recom-
mendations would clarify the role and significance of the various factors
involved in the balancing process of the Board's decision, as well as explain-
ing the relationship of Board policies to the decisional process. Thus, the
recommendations would facilitate effective comparison of Board decisions
and thereby provide affected parties with the best possible opportunity
for effective preparation.
It can be said that the Board's subsidy reduction policy has been de-
tected as having a discernible material effect in some Board decisions but
not in others. Refinements in the Board's decisional process, as suggested
by the above recommendations, would result in more sensitive determina-
tions of the role of Board policy in the decisional process with accompany-
ing advantages for those parties affected by Board policy.
1969]
